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Abstract 
The Turkish government set a policy to become a regional financial center in 2007. This policy 
involved encouraging international banks to enter Turkey and take a more prominent role in the 
Turkish banking industry. Since then the progress has been slow to achieve this policy objective. 
The primary indicator of being a financial center is to have the presence of international banks. 
Even though there are many representative offices in Turkey, few of them changed their status to 
subsidiary or branch to this day. On the contrary, some international banks announced that they 
would downsize their operations. Representative offices have lower investment and compliance 
cost than that of branches and subsidiaries. Banking regulations in Turkey does not differentiate 
much by type, operations and size. Also international banks have to comply their head office 
rules in line with regulators in their home countries.  In this article, we focus on the regulatory 
compliance costs on international banks to open branches and to establish subsidiaries with 
niche market strategy in Turkey. We argue that regulatory compliance costs play a major role on 
the reluctance of international banks’ lack of enthusiasm. 
Key Words: International Banks, Regulatory Compliance, Banking Regulation, Banking 
JEL classification: G21; G28; G15, F33 
Introduction 
Turkey set a policy to create a financial center in Istanbul in 2007. (Özince, 2007) Turkish Bankers 
Association (TBA, 2009) issued a special report for evaluation of becoming financial center and for 
comparison of major financial centers such as England (London), Singapore, Ireland (Dublin), Spain 
(Madrid), Russia (Moscow), Israel (Tel Aviv) and Turkey (Istanbul). The aim was to compete with cities 
such as Dubai and attract more international funds to Turkey. This requires attracting international banks to 
open branches or subsidiaries in Turkey. However, the speed for achieving this goal has been limited.  
We believe that the goal of being a financial center is the right strategy for Turkey and will have positive 
contribution to the Turkish economy. Isık and Gunduz (2012) suggest that new entries could be 
instrumental in boosting resource allocation and utilization based on the analysis of Turkish banking data. 
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In this article we show that some of the banking provisions create obstacles for international banks to 
operate in Turkey. The policy makers should analyze these provisions whether they are necessary to 
control any supervisory risk or they are just a red tape for international banks increasing regulatory 
compliance costs.  
In an important study, Berger et al., (2000) found that, on average, domestic banks have higher profit 
efficiency than foreign banks. They analyzed two main hypotheses: the home field advantage hypothesis 
versus the global advantage hypothesis. The home field advantage hypothesis claims that domestic banks 
are generally more efficient than foreign banks. The global advantage hypothesis assumes some efficiently 
managed foreign banks are able to overcome these cross-border disadvantages and operate more 
efficiently than the domestic banks.  
Recently, some international banks in Turkey closed down their operations and some downsized or exited. 
Portigon A.G. Istanbul Branch ended its operations and initiated liquidation process with decision of BRSA 
in August 2013.1 Citi Group (2013) announced their consumer business to be sold to another bank in 
Turkey. Banco Commercial Portuguese sold its bank in Turkey (Turkish Daily News, 2011) to a Turkish 
businessman. HSBC Turkey searched for a buyer and decided to restructure its business after struggling to 
find one. (Bloomberg, 2016)  
In this article, we will analyze the regulatory compliance costs on international banks to operate in Turkey. 
The next section provides a survey of the literature. In this section, we discuss the relevant analytical works 
and empirical studies on banking regulation, international banks, and taxation and reserve requirements. In 
the third section, we will analyze international banks operating in Turkey with respect to their home 
countries. The fourth section investigates regulatory compliance costs of international banks in Turkey and 
their challenges to comply with those regulations. The final section concludes. 
Literature Review 
It was one of the main discussions was whether to allow international banks to have a higher share in the 
Turkish banking industry during the drafting process of the new Banking Act number 5411. (Turkish Daily 
News, 2005)  The Banking Act did not have any directly banning provisions for international banks. 
Moreover, the former provisions of the banking law were kept mostly intact and a more detailed and 
structured banking law was designed in line with the European Union and international practices. The 
amendments were mainly to control new entry into the banking system, orderly exist process, personal 
liability of senior managers, strong deposit insurance, frequent external audit, detailed call reports and 
concreate penalties etc. 
Demirguç-Kunt and et al., (2003) measured the tighter regulation is by fraction of entry denied, activity 
restrictions, reserve requirements and banking freedom. The “fraction entry denied” is practically 100 
percent until 2011 since Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Agency (BRSA) of Turkey, the independent 
regulator of banking in Turkey, verbally declared its unwillingness to issue any new licenses (Hurriyet, 
2011). They defined the activity restrictions on bank activities in securities markets, insurance, real-estate, 
and owning shares in non-financial firms. Banking Act limits most of those activities in Turkey. Barth et al., 
(2001) defined a variable for “bank activities and ownership restrictiveness”. The scale is between 1 and 4, 
and 4 is the most restricted one. Turkey is considered as 3 within the group of Mexico and US.  
International banks increased their activities through their representative offices and credit sales persons in 
Turkey. BRSA (2006a) issued a regulation to limit those activities. Their regulatory requirement is to obtain 
operating license from BRSA and to provide activity reports to BRSA on a regular basis.  
BRSA remained hesitant to issue a new license for a subsidiary or branches until 2011 (Hurriyet, 2011). 
The general policy was to direct investors (mainly foreign banks) to acquire an existing bank in the sector. 
This kept the number of banks in the industry constant and controlled competition so that systemic risks 
remained low. It had also the unintended consequence of reducing supervision costs of BRSA. BRSA had 
                                                             
1 https://www.bddk.org.tr/WebSitesi/english/Institutions/Banks/Banks.aspx  
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the authority to assess the business plan of banks that applied for a banking license. We believe the 
franchise value of banking license increased significantly due to this policy.  
BRSA declared to have 300 million USD of the minimum capital requirement in 2011. (Turkiye Gazetesi, 
2011) The Banking Act states banks to have minimum of around 10 million USD. BRSA issued a new 
license for OdeaBank, BTMU Turkey and Rabobank, subsidiaries of banks in Lebanon, Japan and 
Netherland respectively. Intesa Saopolo from Italy received a new license to open a branch as a deposit 
taking bank. These banks completed their establishment and started their operations. BRSA issued 
establishment license to the Bank of China in April 2016 and the establishment process should be 
completed within a year. 
During the 1990’s, there were 20 international banks in Turkey but their market share were around 3 
percent in terms of deposits and credits. (Akguc, 2007) The regulatory environment in Turkey was not so 
tight during those years. Some consolidation has occurred during the 2001 banking crisis of Turkey and 
regulations changed significantly. (Yay and Yay, 2012: 56-87). Bakir and Öniş (2010: 90) gives the 
elements of improvements in the performance of the banking sector. 
Bağdadioğlu and Halisçelik (2012: 17-21) explained how regulatory environment, political governance and 
economic stability strengthened in Turkey during the 2000s. Major international banks bought mid-size 
Turkish banks to provide retail banking services to individuals and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
Aysan and Ceyhan (2006) examined the individual cases of foreign bank existence in Turkey and found 
that their reasons confirm ones spelled out in the literature. Aysan and Ceyhan (2007) found that foreign 
banks in Turkey were more efficient than domestic banks and efficiencies converged afterwards. Aysan 
and Ceyhan (2008) determined in their analysis that there are no significant relationship between the 
performance indices and ownership of foreign vs. domestic in Turkey. 
During the 2007-2009 Global Crisis, many international banks faced financial difficulty in their home 
countries and central banks supported their banking system with public funds. Laeven and Valencia (2010) 
provided a classification of those supports as extensive liquidity supports, significant restructuring costs, 
significant asset purchases, significant guarantees on liabilities, and significant nationalizations. None of 
those supports implemented in the Turkish Banking sector because of its strong regulatory environment 
and conservative approach of the banking regulator on credit expansion and use of derivatives. (Yay and 
Yay, 2012: 73-79) Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) analyzed the transmission ways of the Global Crisis due 
to liquidity shocks. 
Yayla (2012: 117) found that the concentration in Turkish Banking had been increasing during the 2000s 
and that net interest margins had been declining during the same period.  Oliver and Wyman (2016:8) 
mentioned that the Turkish banking sector is at the mature stage and is at the highest level of competition 
in the banking sector among key European countries. Risk adjusted return on assets has been declining 
and banks focused on profitability rather than growth since sector is at the maturity stage since 2014. There 
is limited opportunity for new banks to take share in sector with adequate profit. For new banks, it is very 
difficult to obtain retail and SME customers since switching costs are high for those customers to change 
their existing relationships with banks.  
International banks are challenged to apply one of three generic corporate strategies (low cost, 
differentiation and focus) as defined in Porter (2008). The best strategy is to focus on selected corporates 
and their international trade as applied most of the small size international banks such as BTMU Turkey, 
such as Rabobank and Intesa Saopolo. Only OdeaBank has got into the small and medium enterprises 
(SME) and retail customers.  
Demirguç-Kunt et al., (2003) found that tighter regulations on bank entry and bank activities increase the 
cost of financial intermediation. They examined two dependent variables to gauge the cost of financial 
intermediation: the net interest margin and overhead expenditures. From our practical experience, we 
observed that international banks in Turkey have low borrowing advantage from their parents since parent 
has capacity to access international money markets with lower borrowing costs. However lending rates are 
similar to the local market rates because of competition with other banks. The net interest rate margins are 
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higher than the local banks. However, local banks have cross-selling capacity to price with other services 
and better customer relationship management.  
Demirguç-Kunt et al., (2003) defined overhead expenditures as expenses due to operational and control 
factors. Operational costs depend on the number and amount of transactions performed by banks. Control 
costs shall be considered as overhead expenses due to regulatory requirements of head office and local 
regulators. Local regulator, BRSA, require significant amount of call reports, disclosure requirements with 
the external audit approvals and use of local accounting plan. BRSA require those for all banks with almost 
no differentiation of bank size and type.  
Demirguç-Kunt et al., (2003) defined reserve requirements as dummy variable. The level of reserve 
requirements is important for funding cost of banks. Demirguç-Kunt et al., (2003) defined “banking 
freedom” as an index based on the Economic Freedom Index of the Heritage Foundation. However, 
banking freedom definition can be extended to implicit operational requirements such as oath in the 
commercial court with physical presence, requirement for public notary for board decisions, submitting 
comprehensive files to BRSA for senior management and board of directors to prove “fit and proper” 
criteria, and physical meeting of boards etc.  
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) find that interest margins and profitability are negatively related to the 
official reserves based on the data of 80 countries over 1988-1995. This is an implicit taxation. The 
estimated coefficient on the corporate tax rate in the profitability regression is consistent with a full pass-
through of the corporate tax on the bank customers.  
Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2001) extended the analysis to distinguish between domestically owned and foreign 
owned banks. The profitability of foreign owned banks was found to raise relatively little with local corporate 
tax. This can be explained by international profit shifting or by international double tax relief provided by 
parent countries.  
Huizinga and Voget (2009) finds a negative impact of international double taxation on the head quarter 
location following international M&A using individual deals as well as aggregated data. The paper examines 
the impact of international double taxation on the FDI in the banking sector only using information for all 
banks rather than just for those that are newly formed through M&A. The banking focus of this paper allows 
us to consider both a price response through FDI to international double taxation. After the 2008 Global 
Crisis, many countries are thinking of new taxes on their financial systems to help prevent the next crisis 
and also increase the overall tax contribution of the financial sector (IMF, 2010). 
Huizinga et al., (2014) found that international double taxation of foreign-source bank income reduced 
foreign direct investment in banking-sector. For instance, international banks control their operations in 
Turkey from the UK and appoint the board of directors within the UK operations. Since there is no tax treaty 
between the UK and Turkey, those international banks with majority of board resident of the UK are subject 
to double taxation. Their source of income is Turkey and the majority of the board of directors is residents 
of the UK. The only alternative for international banks to avoid double taxation is to have the majority of the 
board from residents of Turkey.  
Schenk (2002) explained that Hong Kong became an international banking center with the unique 
combination of laissez-faire government policy and a vibrant traditional local banking system. Also, the 
number of offices of foreign banks is used as an indicator to become international banking center for the 
comparison. Reed (1980) used additional factors to measure such the size of foreign assets and liabilities. 
International Banks in Turkey  
International banks have to follow home country and host country rules and set local bank policy and 
procedures in line with both rules. Although the international standards such as Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision and EU directives converges, these standards are designed a minimum level of 
prudential rules. Additional prudential regulations are welcomed and accepted as normal application. Due 
to the 2001 crisis of Turkey, the Turkish banking sector has some additional provisions limits international 
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banks to operate in Turkey. We believe that those provisions limit realization of the policy that Istanbul 
becomes a financial center. 
International banks had three major stages to get into the Turkish banking system as shown in the Figure 
1. During the first stage, between 2005 and 2007, international banks such as ING, Dexia, Fortis, BNP 
Paribas and NBG bought midsize banks from Turkish residents. The ratio of total assets of foreign banks in 
Turkey increased to 17 percent from 4 percent.  
The second stage is the BRSA issuance of license for 3 international banks during 2011-2013, namely 
OdeaBank, BTMU Turkey and Rabobank. Since their asset size is small compared to total banking, there is 
very small impact on the ratio of total assets of foreign banks to that of total. The third stage is the jump 
from 20 percent to 30 percent in 2015. This was due to ownership changes in Garanti Bank. BBVA bought 
the share of Garanti Bank in 2015 and controlled the bank with a local partner since then. BBVA purchased 
the some of the shares from the local partner and became controlling shareholder. (FT, 2014) 
 
 
Figure 1: Foreign/ Total Assets, Source: BRSA 
 
Foreign banks can exist in three ways in Turkey, representative offices, branches and subsidiaries. The 
representative offices are the weakest form of existence. They can only act as liaison for the head office 
and have limited operational authority in Turkey. These offices have low funding costs abroad and low 
regulatory requirements, so they prefer to extent their loans from abroad to Turkey. Generally international 
banks prefer to this form since its regulatory compliance cost is lower than branches and subsidiaries.  
As shown in the Table 1, foreign banks have 49 offices and 32 of them based in European countries as of 
2015. Turkey has many EU companies and high volume of international trade with EU countries. Also, 
there are some Asian, American and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. 
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Table 1: Representative Offices of Foreign Banks in Turkey 
Country EU Banks 
EU 32  
Germany 7 Aareal Bank A.G., Commerzbank A.G., Deg-Deutsche Investitions-und Entwicklungsgesellschaft MBH, 
DZ Bank A.G., KFW (Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau), IPEX-Bank GMBH ", Landesbank Berlin, Ziraat 
Bank International AG 
Nederland 6 Credit Europe Bank N.V., Demir-Halk Bank (Nederland) N.V. , Garantibank International N.V., ING 
Bank N.V., Rabobank International, The Economy Bank N.V. 
Switzerland 6 Axion Swiss Bank SA, Bank Julius Baer & Co.Ltd., BSI SA, Credit Europe Bank (Suisse) S.A., UBS 
A.G., Union Bancaire Privée, UBP SA 
Spain 4 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A.(BBVA), Banco Popular Espanol S.A., Banco Sabadell S.A., 
Caixabank S.A. 
France 4 "Banque Internationale de Commerce-, BRED, BNP Paribas S.A., Credit Industriel et Commercial, 
Natixis Sa 
UK 3 ABC International Bank PLC, Goldman Sachs International Bank, Nomura Bank International PLC 
Italy 2 Banca Monte Dei Paschi di Siena S.P.A., Intesa Sanpaolo S.P.A. 
Asian  9  
Japan 2 Mizuho Bank Ltd., Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation 
South Korea 2 Korea Exchange Bank, The Export-Import Bank of Korea 
China 1 Bank of China Limited 
India 1 State Bank of India 
Georgia 1 JSC Bank of Georgia 
Northern Cyprus 1 Near East Bank Limited 
Pakistan 1 Bank Al Habib Limited 
Other 8  
US 3 Citibank N.A., The Bank of New York Mellon, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. 
Canada 1 The Bank of Nova Scotia Türkiye 
Qatar 2 Alubaf Arab International Bank B.S.C., Dubai Islamic Bank 
UEA 2 Doha Bank, Qinvest LLC 
Total 32  
Source: Turkish Bankers Association, 2015 
As of 2015, foreign banks have 25 branches and subsidiaries in Turkey. As shown in the Table 2, 9 of them based in European countries and similarly the 
same number have Asian origin.  
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Table 2: Branches and Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks in Turkey 
Country EU 
EU 9  
UK 3 HSBC Bank plc, The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc., Standard Chartered 
Netherland 2 ING Bank A.Ş., Rabobank A.Ş. 
Germany 1 Deutsche Bank 
France 1 Societe Generale  
Italy 1 Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. 
Spain 1 BBVA 
Asian 9  
Iran 1 Bank Mellat  
Israel  1 Bank Hapoalim 
Pakistan 1 Habib Bank Limited   
Russia 1 Syberbank 
China 1 ICBC  
Japan 1 Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ  
Azerbaijan  1 Pasha 
Lebanon 2 Bank Audi, BankMed   
Other 7  
US 3  Citibank A.Ş., JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., Merrill Lynch Yatırım Bank A.Ş. 
Qatar 2 The Commercial Bank (Q.S.C.), Qatar National Bank SAQ 
Kuwait 1 Burgan Bank  
Libya  1 Libyan Foreign Bank 
Total 25 
Source: Turkish Bankers Association, 2015 
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In the Turkish banking system, traditionally, investment banks are supervised by BRSA. On the other hand, 
these banks are supervised by securities market regulators in EU. For instance, Merrill Lynch is supervised 
by the Securities Exchange Commission of US whereas it is supervised by BRSA in Turkey. These banks 
do not have authority to take any deposit and they are exempted from some of the regulation mentioned in 
the Banking Act such as credit lending limits, commercial trade etc.  
The summary statistics are given in the Table 3 with home country base. BBVA has a very big subsidiary. 
Qatar, Russia, Netherland and UK have midsize subsidiaries. Investment banks are subsidiaries of Bank 
Hapoalim, Merrill Lynch, Pasha and Standard Chartered. They don’t have deposit taking license and fund 
their investment through issuance of bonds or bank borrowings. Bank Mellat, Habib Bank Limited, Intesa 
Sanpaolo S.p.A., JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., Societe Generale and The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc. are 
formed as branches. As branches, they may open branches within Turkey.   
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Foreign Banks in Turkey 
Home 
Country 
Deposit Taking 
Subsidiaries 
Deposit Taking 
Branches 
Investment 
Subsidiary 
Number of 
Branches 
Number of 
Employees 
Spain 1 980 19937 
Qatar 2 684 13698 
Russia 1 689 12733 
Netherlan
d 2 283 5413 
UK 1 1 1 193 4240 
Lebanon 2 90 2218 
Kuwait 1 51 1015 
China 1 44 825 
US 1 1 1 10 592 
Libya  1 7 288 
Israel  1 1 127 
Germany 1 1 121 
France 1 1 93 
Japan 1 1 61 
İran 1 3 49 
Azerbaija
n  1 1 33 
Italy 1 1 28 
Pakistan 1 1 16 
Grand 
Total 15 6 4 3041 61487 
Source: Turkish Bankers Association, June 2016 
 
Regulatory Compliance Costs for Entry 
Regulatory compliance costs can be during the establishment period. Those during the establishment 
period are mainly minimum capital requirement, “fit and proper” criteria, standard general ledger system, 
memberships and licenses as defined in the Banking Act. These requirements are applied to all banks in 
Turkey and in line with prudential regulations of EU Directives and Basel standards. However, these 
requirements creates additional regulatory compliance costs for international banks to enter and operate in 
Turkey.  
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The minimum capital requirement in Banking Act is around USD 10 million. After 2011, BRSA implemented 
a policy to require the minimum capital of 300 USD and to target the minimum capital adequacy ratio of 
%12. Article 9 of EU Directive (2006) requires 5 million EUR of minimum capital. Banks with corporate 
portfolio exposures have 100 percent of risk weighting on average in Turkey. This amount of capital should 
support 2.5 billion USD (=300/12%) assets.  
BRSA conducts detailed “fit and proper” criteria conditions for shareholders having more than 10 percent 
shares directly or indirectly. Similarly decreasing below this threshold requires the BRSA approval. BRSA 
gives approvals on the transfer of shares after the assessment process. In this assessment process, BRSA 
examines documentation from the buyer of the shares to conduct the fit and proper test. This approval 
process can take several months due to delays of corresponding between the regulators and submitting 
necessary documentation.  
The transfer of shares without BRSA approval is legally not valid and liability of seller of the shares 
continues as defined in the Banking Act. In line with EU regulation, this approval process required having 
above or below of the threshold values of 20 percent and 30 percent of the bank’s shares. This approval 
process has a cost to be paid to SDIF for deposit insurance fund according to the Article 18/2 of the 
Banking Act. The cost “transfer of shares fee” is one percent of the nominal value of the transferred shares. 
The new license issuance has two stages as establishment license and operational license. In the first 
stage, BRSA examines the business plans, projections, and fit and proper criteria of shareholders. After 
this permission, bank management has 9 months to complete the establishment process including 
governance, systems, and risk and control procedures.  
At the second stage, BRSA examines if the bank is ready to operate properly. In case of failure, BRSA can 
extent this period for 3 months to complete this process. Before the application for approval, bank has to 
pay “system entrance fee” of 10 percent of the minimum capital requirement of 10 million USD. Practically, 
banks pay 1 million USD as system entrance fee to Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) of Turkey. On 
the other hand, investment banks pay 0.7 million USD since their minimum capital requirement is 7 million 
USD.2  
BRSA (2007) requires banks to apply for a standard general ledger system with detailed account names 
and numbers. This general ledger system is used as the base for all other regulatory reports to BRSA. 
Regulation does not allow banks to use their own general ledger system and convert to the required 
General Ledger system of BRSA. This creates additional costs for banks to implement a local banking 
system and convert data for consolidated financial reports and supervision of the head office.  
There are few providers of local banking system with proper maintenance support. The costs of the 
software and its implementation costs can be very high. Also, banks need some additional development 
based on their business requirements and head office data requirements. This causes significant increases 
in establishment costs of subsidiaries and branches of international banks.  
Banks are required to obtain licenses from Capital Market Board (CMB) if they have any operations related 
with securities market. Even buying and selling foreign exchange forward contracts requires CMB license. 
Similarly, fixed income and other security market transactions require additional licenses. In order to 
perform transaction, CMB regulations require banks to have licensed staff for treasury, risk management 
and operations. Banks staff can obtain these licenses through taking exams conducted by the CMB 
approved exam center.3 Furthermore, the central counterparty of Turkey (Takasbank) requires to be a 
customer for security market transactions and local money market transactions.4 
In order to send and receive Turkish Lira wire transfer for banks’ customers, the Central Bank of Republic 
of Turkey (CBRT) requires banks to become a member of Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) system. Banks 
send this application to CBRT after receiving operational license from BRSA. IT departments of banks and 
                                                             
2 The Banking Act spels the amounts in TRY and the rate of 1 USD = 3 TRY is used for conversion.  
3 http://www.spl.com.tr/Home/Anasayfa  
4 https://www.takasbank.com.tr/en/Pages/MainPage.aspx  
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CBRT set up technological infrastructure and security protocols. CBRT senior management approves the 
application within almost one month. 
The Credit Registry Bureau requires banks to become a member and report regularly all credit activities for 
each customer. Non-compliance for those rules such as misreporting or not meeting deadlines requires 
monetary penalties.  
The Banking Act requires banks to become a member of Turkish Bankers Association. After a formal 
application, the board of TBA approves the application.5 TBA has authorities and responsibilities to banks 
and BRSA. Banks has to pay an annual fee for the membership. For the Islamic banks, there is another 
organization, namely Participation Banks Association of Turkey.6  
International banks can form their entity in Turkey as subsidiary or branches. Almost all the provisions are 
the same for subsidiaries and branches established in Turkey. A few differences are their board structure 
and governance committees. Practically, BRSA requires subsidiaries to appoint a minimum of 5 Board 
members and establish audit committee, nomination committee and credit committee etc. If a bank is below 
the 5 Board member threshold and does not appoint a new member within a limited time, the Banking Act 
requires applying monetary penalty. Bank executives like chief officers or deputy general managers cannot 
serve as Board members. Whereas, branches of international banks should have minimum of 3 board 
member and board members can serve as executive officers. 
Board members and senior managers have to provide evidence of their education and submit criminal 
reports from their home country for the fit and proper criteria. They shall give declaration of wealth to BRSA 
at the beginning and end of their service at the banks. They have to take an oath in a Turkish court to abide 
the Banking regulations properly. This is an additional burden on subsidiaries and branches of international 
banks.  
Regulatory Compliance Costs for Operations 
Those during the operation period are deposit insurance, regulatory reports, independent internal systems, 
external financial audit, external IT audit, regulatory penalties and labor law requirements. “Monetary 
penalties” and “deposit insurance premiums” are paid to SDIF for deposit insurance system in Turkey. 
Cabukel and Frisch (2012: 150-153) explained the ex-ante based the “deposit insurance premium” in 
Turkey. The deposit insurance premium is based on a differential premium system and determined based 
on 15 risk factors.  Banks are divided into 4 groups and pay quarterly 0.11-0.19 percent on insured 
deposits. Insured deposits are real person deposits that are not related with business up to approximately 
30.000 USD.  
BRSA has created very detailed call reports on daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly basis. These reports 
are a base for off-site monitoring of BRSA. BRSA produces and publishes regularly some of those reports 
with consolidated basis on their website.7 These reporting mechanisms was created after the 2001 Crisis of 
Turkey and have supported the transparency of the banking sector. Especially subsidiaries and branches 
of international banks have limited number of transactions and has to bear reporting costs due to allocating 
reporting staff and maintenance of reporting systems. There are cross controls between forms and BRSA 
approval should be received for the completion of the reporting. Non-compliance of this reporting 
requirement has monetary penalty and cause supervisory warnings of BRSA.  
BRSA (2006) regulation requires to appoint a board member responsible from internal systems on behalf of 
the board. This means, the board member is the direct reporting line for departments of internal audit, risk 
management, internal control and compliance. This function cannot be outsourced to external parties 
including Head office and cannot be consolidated or merged with others. Considering compliance for the 
regulation in a timely manner and backup structures, these offices require minimum 2 staff each and total 
of 6 staff.    
                                                             
5 https://www.tbb.org.tr/en/home  
6 http://www.tkbb.org.tr/en  
7 http://www.bddk.org.tr/WebSitesi/english/Statistical_Data/Statistical_Data.aspx  
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BRSA (2015) requires banks’ financial statements to be audited by external auditors on a quarterly basis, 
approved by board of directors and send to BRSA and TBA. The external auditors should be on the list 
approved by BRSA. The list consists of local offices of international big four audit firms because of 
selection criteria’s. The audit costs are high because of its frequency and oligopolistic market structure of 
auditors. Also, annual audit requires process audit to make sure proper control functions set within the 
banks.  
Aktan et al., (2009) described the financial shenanigans of Imar Bank Inc. After the fraudulent Imar Bank 
failure, BRSA (2006b) issued a regulation on information technology (IT) audit requirement by external 
auditors. BRSA (2010a) updated the regulation with some changes. Banks required having this audit once 
in every 2 years and sending to BRSA after approval of their Board. The audit process requires additional 
cost for auditors, staff cost for banks and remediation cost for the findings.  
The Banking Act stated rules and regulation of banking in Turkey. In case of non-compliance to those 
provisions such as reserve requirements, IT audit requirements, financial reporting, credit lending limits etc. 
BRSA board has the authority to charge monetary fines as mentioned Article 143-146. These penalties 
paid to the SDIF for deposit insurance system.8 Banks in Turkey paid around a total of 2 million USD 
annually on average during 2006-2014.9 There are on average 50 banks in Turkey and each bank on 
average paid 40.000 USD annually.  
Labor law requires to employ handicapped or formerly imprisoned person for banks more than 50 staff. 
Banks are allowed to have one expatriate for the employment of 4 Turkish citizens. So, subsidiaries and 
branches of international banks required to optimize their human resources policy accordingly.  
Turkish Treasury (2011) has a regulations limit local companies to borrow in foreign currency for financial 
stability purposes. Since USD and EUR interest rates are lower, companies willing to borrow in foreign 
currency. Companies that have foreign currency income can borrow in foreign currency. Others restricted 
to have loan amount with minimum of 5 million USD with 1 year of average maturity.  
Bank in Turkey has pay tax on interest charged for loans, namely Banking and Insurance Transaction Tax 
(BITT, the Turkish abbreviation of BSMV) on interest charged by banks located in Turkey. Companies have 
to pay a special tax on credits borrowed abroad. The tax name is The Resource Utilization Support Fund 
Rate (RUSF, Turkish abbreviation of KKDF). This means that subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks pay 
BITT and representative offices pay RUSF due to loans intermediated.10 BITT is 5% on interest income. 
RUSF has different rates based on the average maturity of loans. RUSF rates are 3% up to 1 year, 1% up 
to 2 years, 0.5% up to 3 years and 0% for others.  
Alper and et al. (2014) showed evidence the use of reserve requirements and the central bank funding 
mechanism.  International banks are disadvantaged to utilize the central bank funding mechanism in case 
subsidiaries of international banks do not to hold Turkish Treasury Bills and Bonds.  
Conclusions 
The Turkish banking sector is highly competitive and requires local market knowledge, and fast decision 
making processes. Generally, the international banks try to standardize the processes and set risk controls 
on processes and decisions of subsidiaries and branches. This limits their competition ability to cope with 
the speed of market. The best strategy is cost controlled and niche market strategy for them. Due to high 
entrance cost and implicit operational cost as explained in this article, this strategy can be hard to 
implement. 
                                                             
8 These kind of monetary penalties are no common the banking regulation around the World. These penalties create 
additional reputational and regulatory risk for Head Offices. A Head Office might be challenged by home supervisors 
the reasons for the penalty.  
9 The amount of penalties collected can be found in the Annual Reports of SDIF. http://www.tmsf.org.tr/yillik.rapor.en 
10https://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/taxnewsflash/Documents/turkey-jan4-
2013.pdf  
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Furthermore, there are some implicit restrictions for activities of international banks. The reporting and 
control requirements of BRSA and Head Office make some operations practically not feasible to provide 
some product and services. International banks generally product approval processes for consolidated 
financial and regulatory reporting. Even if they extended one single piece of deposit for individuals they are 
obliged to use certain accounting general ledger and to fill in call reports to Head Office and BRSA.  They 
are required to define additional internal control and risk management processes for each product and 
services.  
The establishment period of a bank takes almost one year. Especially, international banks consider this 
establishment as a new project with so many international advisors. International banks should carefully 
take into account the cost of establishment for their cash flow analysis. 
BRSA apply the same rules for all banks without differentiation of type, operation or size. We believe 
regulatory compliance costs have significant impact on the decision of international banks to operate in 
Turkey. Policy makers in Turkey should evaluate these regulatory compliance costs if they are really 
needed or they are just a red tape for international banks. The banking regulations should be balanced in 
way that Turkey meet the standards of international banking regulations such as Basel and EU. However, 
having unnecessary prudential regulations limits Turkey’s policy objectives of being a financial center.  
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